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A matching model, combined with a shirking model of efficiency wages, is examined. It
depends on sources of unemployment variation whether the no-shirking condition (NSC)
tends to be binding as the unemployment rate is lower. When only productivity varies, the
NSC tends to be binding as the unemployment rate is higher, as in Rocheteau (2001).
However, when only matching efficiency varies, the NSC tends to be binding as the
unemployment rate is lower.
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Wage rigidity appears important to explain aggregate behavior of frictional labor markets. However,
our understanding about consequences of intra-￿rm work incentive problems to wage rigidity and labor
market behavior appears still limited1. I examine how work incentive problems a⁄ect wage rigidity
and variation in vacancy creation in a search and matching model (Pissarides 1985, 2000) in which
employees￿e⁄ort choice problem is incorporated by way of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) type e¢ ciency
wage arrangements. I examine economies with di⁄erent kinds of disturbances to the economy. Variation
in unemployment and wages can be generated by changes in either productivity, matching e¢ ciency,
vacancy costs, separation probabilities and so on. Of course, in the business cycle frequencies, variation
in aggregate productivity appears most important. But, it is also important to consider economies with
di⁄erent sources of unemployment variation in order to better understand mechanisms of how incentives
a⁄ect wage rigidity and, thereby, employment variation. This is how my analysis di⁄ers from Rocheteau
(2001), who also provides a systematic analysis of a matching model with e¢ ciency wages.
Suppose that workers face binary decisions of e⁄ort levels, say, work and shirk. In equilibrium in
which workers choose to work every period, workers￿gains from employment must be large enough
compared to the cost of e⁄ort. I call this the no-shirking condition (NSC). I ￿nd that it depends
on sources of unemployment variation whether the NSC tends to be binding as the unemployment is
lower. When only productivity varies, the NSC tends to be binding as the unemployment is higher,
as in Rocheteau. However, when only matching e¢ ciency varies, the NSC tends to be binding as the
unemployment rate is lower. This ￿nding may help to better understanding the e⁄ects of no-shirking
conditions on aggregate labor market behavior. As far as the author can tell, our understanding of
matching models with no-shirking conditions is limited2.
This article is structured as follows. The next section builds a matching search model, combined with
workers￿shirking problems. Section 3 examines the relationship between the likelihood of no-shirking




Time is discrete: t 2 f1;2;3;￿￿￿g. The beginning of period t is called date t ￿ 1, and its end date t.
Only steady states are considered.
1On the one hand, some authors argue that work incentive problems dampens employment ￿ uctuations, since during
recessions wages do not have to be high (Kimball 1994; Strand 1992). On the other, it is also known that rigid wages are
generated in a matching economy with employees￿e⁄ort choice problems (Costain and Jansen 2006; Gomme 1999).
2Gomme (1999), for instance, shows that the RBC model with no-shirking conditions generates strongly procyclical
real wages. It is yet to be seen whether matching models with no-shirking conditions may deliver the similar result.
Costain and Jansen (2006) examine the similar model.
1Agents and Preferences. This economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral workers and
￿rms, both of whom discount future payo⁄s at the common discount factor ￿ 2 [0;1). The preference of




txt, where xt is consumption minus the cost of exerting e⁄ort for a worker,
and it is a pro￿t net of the cost of being vacant for a ￿rm.
Production Technology. A pair of a worker and ￿rm during employment in tenure t 2
f1;2;3;￿￿￿g produces et ￿ y, in which et 2 f0;1g is the worker￿ s e⁄ort level, y 2 R++ is match quality,
which is assumed to be the same across employment periods. The worker incurs a cost c ￿ et when
choosing e⁄ort et 2 f0;1g, where c > 0 is assumed. Each match separates with probability s 2 [0;1]
each period for exogenous reasons.
Search Technology. Let ￿ ￿ v=u be the vacancy-unemployment ratio, where v is a measure
of vacant ￿rms and u unemployed job seekers. Each unemployed worker contacts a vacant ￿rm with
probability ￿p(￿) per period, where p0(￿) > 0. Each vacant ￿rm contacts a job-seeker with probability
￿q(￿) per period, where q0(￿) < 0. Functions p(￿) and q(￿) are related in such a way that p(￿) = ￿q(￿).
The parameter ￿ > 0 captures the degree of meeting e¢ ciency in a frictional labor market. I assume
that lim￿!0 p(￿) = 0, lim￿!1 p(￿) = 1=￿, lim￿!0 q(￿) = 1=￿, and lim￿!1 q(￿) = 0. 3
Asset Equations. Now, I write down a bunch of asset equations. The value of unemployment U
satis￿es the following equations:
U = z + ￿￿p(￿)V + ￿[1 ￿ ￿p(￿)]U (1)
where z is the ￿ ow utility of each unemployed job seeker, V the value of employment for each employee.
The value of employment for each employee, exerting high e⁄ort, V must satisfy the following asset
equation:
V = w ￿ c + (1 ￿ s)￿V + s￿U (2)
where w is the ￿ ow wage level. The value of each ￿lled job J must satisfy the following equation:
J = y ￿ w + (1 ￿ s)￿J (3)
No-shirking Conditions. It is assumed for simplicity that monitoring employees￿e⁄ort is perfect
in the sense that the employee￿ s e⁄ort level is observed with no noise. However, it is assumed that e⁄ort
is unveri￿able. As a consequence, any agreements contingent on e⁄ort levels are not enforceable. When
the worker chooses high e⁄ort (e=1), the employment continues unless the match receives exogenous
separation shocks. When the worker chooses low e⁄ort (e=0), the employment is terminated. The
employee chooses high e⁄ort (e=1) if ￿c + w + ￿(1 ￿ s)V + ￿sU ￿ w + ￿U, which is rewritten as:
￿(1 ￿ s)(V ￿ U) ￿ c (4)
3One example satisfying these assumptions is q(￿) = [1 ￿ exp(￿1
￿)]=￿.
2We call this inequality the no-shirking condition, or NSC in what follows.
Wage Determination. When the worker and ￿rm choose to match, they choose the wage level by
bargaining, so that the no-shirking condition is satis￿ed. A ￿ ow wage is determined so that it maximizes
the Nash product (V ￿ U)￿J1￿￿ subject to the non-shirking inequality:
w = argmax(V ￿ U)
￿J
1￿￿ s.t. (NSC) (5)
If the NSC is not binding, the solution is as the same as the standard Nash bargaining solution, which
is given by (1 ￿ ￿)(V ￿ U) = ￿J. However, if the NSC is binding, the solution will be V ￿ U = c
￿(1￿s),
J = S ￿ c
￿(1￿s), where the match surplus S is de￿ned by S ￿ V + J ￿ U. By using equations (2) and
(3), one can show that S =
y￿c￿(1￿￿)U
1￿￿(1￿s) .
Free Entry of Vacancies. Each vacant ￿rm incurs recruiting cost k > 0 per period in ￿nding a
worker. Entry into the labor market is free. This implies the following equation:
k = ￿￿q(￿)J (6)
Now, we can de￿ne a steady state equilibrium of a search model with workers￿shirking problems.
De￿nition 1. A steady state equilibrium of a search matching model with workers￿ shirking
problems is de￿ned as a list fU;V;J;w;￿;ug such that: (i) U, V , and J satisfy equations (1), (2) and
(3); (ii) ￿ satis￿es equation (6); (iii) w satis￿es the problem (5); and (iv) u satis￿es the steady state
accounting: (1 ￿ u)s = u￿p(￿).
The de￿nition given above is very standard except the part (iii), where wages must satisfy the NSC.
If the NSC were not binding in equilibrium, the model would behave like the standard search matching
models of Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides. It is interesting to see when the NSC is likely to be
binding. A steady state equilibrium of a search model with workers￿shirking problems de￿ned above is
characterized by a pair (￿;U) satisfying the following two equations:
U = z + ￿￿p(￿)max[￿S;
c
￿(1 ￿ s)
] + ￿U (7)
k
￿￿q(￿)




Proposition 1. Consider a matching model with workers￿shirking problems described above. Let
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Then, a steady state equilibrium of the model, in which the NSC is binding, exists and it is unique.
One can ￿nd parameters satisfying the two boundary assumptions made in each part in Proposition
1. Pick the values of all parameters, except ￿ and the shape of q(￿) so that the ￿rst inequality ￿(0) > 0
is satis￿ed. Then, one can ￿nd the values of ￿ and the shape of q(￿) so that the second inequality
(￿(￿) < 0 in part a; ￿(￿) ￿ 0 in part b) is satis￿ed.
3 No-shirking Conditions and Labor Markets
In this section, the relationship between the likelihood that no-shirking conditions bind and the unem-
ployment rate is examined. Addressing this question serves the purpose of better understanding the
relation between work incentive problems and labor market conditions.
Proposition 2 (Variation in Worker Productivity). Consider a class of matching models
de￿ned above with two di⁄erent levels of productivity yG > yB. There are no equilibria in which the NSC
is binding in the state of lower unemployment rates and it is not in the state of higher unemployment
rates.
The key to understanding Proposition 2 is that the gains from employment for workers have to
be su¢ ciently large for workers to be motivated to exert high e⁄ort. Hence, if employees￿gains from
employment were very large, the NSC would not be binding. Otherwise, the NSC would be binding.
4Another key behind Proposition 2 is that when only productivity varies, the state of lower unemployment
rates corresponds to the state of large match surplus, and vice versa. Recall that when the NSC is not
binding, workers￿gains from employment is a ￿xed proportion of the match surplus. Suppose that the
NSC is binding in the state of lower unemployment rates. The reason why the NSC is binding is that
the size of the match surplus is very small. Then, the match surplus is smaller in the state of higher
unemployment rates than in the state of lower unemployment rates. The NSC would be binding, too,
in this state of higher unemployment. Therefore, one can say that when the NSC is binding in the
lower-unemployment-rate state, it is binding, too, in the higher-unemployment-rate state. Similarly,
one can say that when the NSC is not binding in the higher-unemployment-rate state, it is not binding
in the lower-unemployment-rate state.
Proposition 2 is silent about whether it is possible that the NSC is not binding in the state of lower
unemployment rates and it is in the state of higher unemployment rates. The next proposition below
shows this.
Proposition 3 (Variation in Worker Productivity). Consider a class of matching models
de￿ned above with two di⁄erent levels of productivity yG > yB. For j 2 fB;Gg, let
￿j ￿
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Then, there are equilibria in which the NSC is binding in state B and it is not in state G.
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 1. jj
By following Rocheteau (2001), call the wages when the NSC is binding e¢ ciency wages in what
follows. Call the wages when the NSC is not binding freely negotiated wages. Proposition 2 and 3
suggest that e¢ ciency wages are relevant when the unemployment is above a certain threshold, when
5only workers￿productivity varies. However, this equilibrium feature is not robust to di⁄erences in
disturbances to the economy, as the next two propositions below show.
Proposition 4 (Variation in Matching E¢ ciency). Consider a class of matching models de￿ned
above with two di⁄erent levels of matching e¢ ciency ￿G > ￿B. There are no equilibria in which the NSC
is binding in the state of higher unemployment rates and it is not in the state of lower unemployment
rates.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is similar to the one behind Proposition 2. It is important to
notice that when only matching e¢ ciency varies, the match surplus is larger in the state of higher un-
employment rates than the other state. This is opposite to the case in which only workers￿productivity
varies. Given this observation, Proposition 4 can be understood in the similar way as Proposition 2.
Proposition 5 (Variation in Matching E¢ ciency). Consider a class of matching models de￿ned
above with two di⁄erent levels of matching e¢ ciency ￿G > ￿B. For j 2 fB;Gg, let
￿ ￿
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Then, there are equilibria in which the NSC is binding in state G and it is not in state B.
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 1. jj
Propositions 4 and 5 suggest that, in the economy with variations in only matching e¢ ciency,
e¢ ciency wages are relevant if the unemployment rate is below a certain threshold. This is in contrast
to the economy with variations in only worker productivity, in which e¢ ciency wages are relevant if the
unemployment rate is above a certain threshold.
Propositions 2, 3, 4 and 5 illustrate that it depends on sources of unemployment variation whether
the NSC tends to be binding as the unemployment rate is lower. The punch-line is this: the size of match
6surplus in the state of the lower unemployment rate is not necessarily larger than the one in the state
of the higher unemployment rate. This enriches the insight of Rocheteau (2001). This point may be
helpful to understand why in some literature work incentives problems dampen employment ￿ uctuations
(Strand 1992 e.g.), while in others work incentives amplify employment ￿ uctuations (Costain and Jansen
2006 e.g.).
4 Conclusion
A matching model, combined with a shirking model of e¢ ciency wages, was examined. When only
productivity varies, the NSC tends to be binding as the unemployment is higher, as in Rocheteau (2001).
However, when only matching e¢ ciency varies, the NSC tends to be binding as the unemployment rate is
lower. This ￿nding may have important implications for practical labor market policies, such as working
time regulation, which was examined in the similar framework by Rocheteau (2002). Moreover, my
￿nding in this paper may help to address the issue raised by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005)4. My
conjecture tells that if procyclical productivity variation is more dominant than matching e¢ ciency
variation, then adding no-shirking conditions may help the DMP models to deliver larger ￿ uctuations
of vacancies and unemployment.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
(part a) Consider, ￿rst, the case in which the NSC is not binding. Then, the equilibrium is given
by (￿;U) such that (1 ￿ ￿)U = z + ￿￿p(￿)￿S and k = ￿￿q(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)S, where S =
y￿c￿(1￿￿)U
1￿￿(1￿s) . By





￿(1￿￿)￿q(￿) = 0. By the two boundary assumptions
stated in the proposition, ￿(0) =
y￿c￿z
1￿￿(1￿s) ￿ k
￿(1￿￿) > 0. Moreover, ￿(￿) < 0. Since ￿(￿) is continuous
in ￿, the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists ￿e 2 (0;￿) such that ￿(￿e) = 0. Since ￿(￿)
is monotonically decreasing, such ￿e is unique. It is easily checked that the NSC is not binding for ￿ < ￿.
(part b) Consider, next, the case in which the NSC is binding in equilibrium. Then, the equilibrium
is given by (￿;U) such that (1 ￿ ￿)U = z + ￿￿p(￿) c
￿(1￿s) and k = ￿￿q(￿)[S ￿ c
￿(1￿s)]. By eliminating






1￿￿(1￿s) = 0. By the boundary assumptions stated in the




1￿￿(1￿s) > 0. (Note that this is implied by the assumed inequality
￿(0) > 0.) Moreover, ￿(1) < 0. Since ￿(￿) is continuous in ￿, the intermediate value theorem implies
that there exists ￿e 2 (0;1) such that ￿(￿e) = 0. Since ￿(￿) is monotonically decreasing, such ￿e is
unique. By construction, the NSC is binding for such ￿e, since ￿(￿) ￿ 0. jj
Proof of Proposition 2.
4I thank Guillaume Rocheteau for suggesting this to me.
7Consider a matching economy with two di⁄erent levels of productivity: yG > yB. Conjecture that
the unemployment rate is lower in state G than in state B, which will turn out to be the case below.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there are equilibria in which the NSC is binding in state G and it
is not in state B, i.e., ￿(1￿s)￿SG ￿ c and ￿(1￿s)￿SB > c. The two inequalities imply that SG < SB.
Then, free entry equation in state B implies that k
￿￿q(￿B) = (1￿￿)SB. Free entry in state G implies that
k = ￿￿q(￿G)[SG ￿ c
￿(1￿s)]. Note that Sj is decreasing in ￿j for each j. Therefore, ￿j satisfying each free
entry equation in state j exists and it is unique. We have that SG ￿ c
￿(1￿s) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)SG < (1 ￿ ￿)SB.




1￿￿(1￿s) . Since yG > yB, and
￿B > ￿G, we have that SG > SB. Contradiction. Therefore, there are no such equilibria in which the
NSC is binding in state G and it is not in state B. Therefore, there are three kinds of possibilities: (i)
the NSC is binding in neither state; (ii) the NSC is binding in both states; and (iii) the NSC is binding
in state B and it is not in state G. One can easily show that uG < uB for every case. Consider case (i)
￿rst. Free entry in state j 2 fB;Gg implies that k
￿￿q(￿j) = (1 ￿ ￿)Sj. yG > yB implies ￿G > ￿B. Steady
state accounting implies that uG < uB. Consider, next, the case (ii). Free entry in state j implies that
k
￿￿q(￿j) = Sj ￿ c
￿(1￿s). This, with yG > yB, implies ￿G > ￿B. This implies uG < uB. Finally, consider the
case (iii), in which ￿(1 ￿ s)￿SB ￿ c and ￿(1 ￿ s)￿SG > c. These two inequalities imply that SG > SB.
Free entry in state G is k
￿￿q(￿G) = (1￿￿)SG. Free entry in state B is k
￿￿q(￿B) = SB ￿ c
￿(1￿s) ￿ (1￿￿)SB.
Then, we have that SB ￿ c
￿(1￿s) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)SB < (1 ￿ ￿)SG. Free entry equations imply that ￿G > ￿B,
which implies uG < uB. The result follows. jj
Proof of Proposition 4.
Consider a matching economy with two di⁄erent levels of matching e¢ ciency: ￿G > ￿B. Conjecture
that the unemployment rate is lower in state G than in state B, which will turn out to be the case
below. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there are equilibria in which the NSC is binding in
state B and it is not in state G. Then, we have that ￿(1 ￿ s)￿SG > c and ￿(1 ￿ s)￿SB ￿ c. The two
inequalities imply SG > SB. Then, free entry equation in state G implies that k
￿￿Gq(￿G) = (1 ￿ ￿)SG.
Free entry in state B implies that k = ￿￿Bq(￿B)[SB ￿ c
￿(1￿s)]. Note that Sj is decreasing in ￿j for
each j. Therefore, ￿j satisfying each free entry equation in state j exists and it is unique. We have
that SB ￿ c





1￿￿(1￿s) . Since ￿G > ￿B, we have that SG < SB. Contradiction. Therefore, there are no
equilibria in which the NSC is binding in state B and it is not in state G. What remains to show is that
uG < uB for whatever the case. There are three kinds of possibilities: (i) the NSC is binding in neither
state; (ii) the NSC is binding in both states; and (iii) the NSC is binding in state G and it is not in
state B. One can easily show that uG < uB for every case. Consider case (i) ￿rst. Free entry in state
j 2 fB;Gg implies that k
￿￿jq(￿j) = (1￿￿)Sj. ￿G > ￿B implies ￿G > ￿B. Steady state accounting implies
that uG < uB. Consider, next, the case (ii). Free entry in state j implies that k
￿￿jq(￿j) = Sj ￿ c
￿(1￿s).
This, with ￿G > ￿B, implies ￿G > ￿B. This implies uG < uB. Finally, consider the case (iii), in which
￿(1 ￿ s)￿SB > c and ￿(1 ￿ s)￿SG ￿ c. The two inequalities imply SG < SB. The de￿nition of Sj
implies ￿G > ￿B. The steady state accounting with ￿G > ￿B implies that uG < uB. The result follows.
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